Our Faculty of Listening as the Source of the Human Mind, Its Civilisational Neutralisation and Its Philosophical Self-Resilience

The Faculty of Listening at the Source of Human Mind/h4>

Our faculty of listening is regulating our use of our 5 senses as well as it is the source of our mental world. Its neutralization is occurring today in a complex and radical way, and we need to understand this complexity to demonstrate that this faculty possesses its own self-resilience. It is possible to do it if we combine the results of the anthropobiology of language elaborated by A. Gehlen [1] with the audio-phonology of A. Tomatis [2]. Gehlen discovered in the thirties that the human being needs the use of language in order to be able to live. Tomatis confirmed this view indeed in the fifties by establishing that the use of hearing the sounds does indeed condition the use of the phonological apparatus of our tongue when we are emitting sounds. For what? To find there the same happiness that he had taken from listening to the voice of the mother in its intra-uterine listening. Because the human being is not a fully developed biological being and is born about a year too early compared to mammals of similar complexity, he possesses only intraspecific instincts (nutritional, sexual and defensive) towards its human fellows. He therefore needs to invent his world by projecting in the world and in the other human beings the harmony between the sounds that he emits and receives in order to programme itself its conditions of life. When this phono-audiological movement is projected in the world, it is allowing the human runt to fix itself to realities with its eyes, i.e. by seeing these ones and to find in these realities what is vital and enjoying itself in these realities. This use of language was called “prosopopoeia” by William von Humboldt to [3] make clear that the way in which poets and playwrights make speak the world, stones, springs, animals in their poems or in their plays does not constitute only an artistic process, but that it is presenting itself as the original use of language, as the source of dia logue, of intersubjective actions and of art. This prosopopoeia continues therefore to animate our daily life as well as all sorts of life that we are able to live.

In this way we also discovered that our life is exclusively a dialogue because this dialogue is the only thing that makes our life possible. First, the human child has to make the world speak by using this prosopopoeia to be able to perceive it with his own eyes. The child experiences this harmony in an animistic way by using sounds because of its inability to perceive a difference between the sounds it is emitting and those it is then hearing. It lends also its heard sounds to the world with which it is identifying itself for the same reason. Arnold Gehlen’s anthropobiology confirmed therefore this linguistic hypothesis [3]. This inner regulation of the voice by hearing it and by the anticipation of the results of using this voice is transferring itself this way in the different uses of the human sensibility. The use of the eyes is conditioned by this inner regulation in the following way: it is consisting of a projection of the movement of emitting and hearing sounds in the visual movement itself and the result of this movement is giving to the visual experience a value of enjoyment that is indissociable and comparable to the enjoyment of using emitted and received sounds. The infant is acquiring with this experience the capacity of enjoying what was before felt as aggressive: it becomes able to inverse into an enjoyable experience the reception of visual chaotic sensations that are not determining a motoric answer like in the case of well-formed animals, but are only cumulating an undetermined and intense anxiety. This inversion of the unpleasant value into an enjoyable experience is giving him the capacity of enjoying oneself of this experience and of fixing oneself to the activities of perceiving visually the realities. But because it may not perceive at the beginning a difference between emitted and heard sounds and between things and what it is seeing in these things, it is feeling its own sounds and visual experience as a unique and undifferentiated answer of the world itself.

The use of this prosopopoeia does not limit itself to the use of language by emitting and receiving sounds: it is transferring itself in every sensitive perception. Because of a certain physical asymmetry in the throat, the nervous circuit between ears and the use of tongue is producing an asymmetry between the use of the ears: usually the right one is guiding the left one. The use of the five senses is submitted to this asymmetry because the circuit between ears and throat is underlying the principles of their sensitivity. By submitting the use of the five senses to this asymmetry, it is producing what is called the lateralisation of our senses: the right one is usually also regulating the left one. This simple regulative use of our ears cannot itself be viewed or registered by the dualistic psychology of the brain or by the so-called cognitive psychology, because this one is only able to register together all the results of this complex articulation of the five senses. This kind of knowledge is therefore unable to recognize thar our activity of listening is indeed dynamizing what the Greeks called the “aesthesis” itself, i.e. that it is dynamizing every perception whatever physiological or cultural as well as it is regulating the creative cultural power of everybody.

The reason is very simple. This audio-phonic harmony lends its own law to the dynamics of the imagination, of our thought and of our desires in the following way: every hiatus and every disharmony with the world must be overcome by projecting a new form of pre-harmony with the world, with others and with ourselves. As we spontaneously pre-harmonize by our ears the sounds that we are emitting with the same sounds that we try to hear, we pre-harmonize our perceptions, actions and desires as the most favourable responses we can expect from the world, from others and from ourselves. In order to bring this about, we must recollect all the elements of our past experience that are concerned by the distorted situation that is confronting us. The happiness felt by listening to the favourable prosopopoeia of the world that speaks to us in our visual perception of something in this world has become thereby a source of delight. Because our access to perception is always anticipated and filtered by the words that we project into the world to isolate objects and identify them with what we see of them by using our predicates, we experience the verbal activity of this perception as a response as favourable as our own sounds when we listen to them. Converting chaotic sensations into gratifying perceptions, the child is linking the gratifications felt in listening to the world with the joys it is feeling by seeing them as well as by hearing them. Projecting into the world the privileged access to communication that it shared with its’s mother answers and since its mother’s responses were felt to be gratifying, it comes to perceive this visual world as the speaker of a positive answer, expressing simultaneously both its need and the way to satisfy it.

This movement allows to it to produce an effective reversal of his impulses: instead of perceiving stimuli requiring a physical reaction on its part and of being projected towards the appropriate consummatory action, it transforms the visual perceptual stimulus linked to the sounds that it intends and means, in a pure consummatory action of itself [4]. Because this inversion of the biological circuits which is characterizing the use of the human voice is thereby transferred to any sensible experience, because the use of listening of our sounds underlies any use of our five senses, this articulation of the sense of reality to the experience of enjoying it, is itself transferred to the use of these five senses. But it is allowing too to explain the birth of our thinking. As a listening of our listening, the thought is produced by what we usually call the “interiorisation” of our outer world: we can enjoy an external experience without having to express it phonetically with our tongue because the regulative use of our experience by listening it, is investing itself in the self-enjoyment of itself, in its autonomous renewing and anamnesis. It is self-referring by becoming conscious of itself automatically as soon as it is happening as an enjoyment of itself in our thought. This ability of thinking is usually conceived as the characteristic of ourselves that is differentiating us from the animals. This listening of our listening is much more: it is affirming indeed to be the secret of our ability to think. During this experience that is perpetually repeating itself by creating thereby our temporal experience, the fruits of our external experience are the objects of enjoyment as well as the enjoyment of the objectivity of this experience although this experience is only thought. The hedonic pleasure of the inversion of our biological circuits is transferring itself in this way to our thought itself. The experience of thought is making itself self-sufficient as a source of knowledge and of enjoyment although it does not know from where it is coming as long as this thought itself does not know how its own genesis is brought about.

As we spontaneously harmonize the sounds that we are uttering with the same sounds that we are receiving, we pre-harmonize by our self-listening our perceptions, our actions and our desires as the best favourable ways by means of which the world and our human fellows could answer to us. This pre harmonization is animating the listening in its physical reality as well as the thought itself: it is indeed already inhabiting every use of a proposition, private, intersubjective or public. The cognitive and logical pre-harmonization which is bearing the propositions by means of which we objectivize the perceptions, actions, thoughts, feelings and desires is always the same: we are unable to think a proposition, i. e. to produce it, without thinking that this proposition is true. The uses of our propositions are therefore creative of all the experiences of our world, but they are also recognitive of what they are objectivizing. They are miming the power of the voice to create sounds and to recognize them as identical or different with the sounds that were anticipated by our anticipatory pre-harmonizing listening of these sounds.

This listening is intern to the proposition: it allows us to recognize whether the thing named is identical with its property (named by our predicate) when we affirm, by example that ‘the snow is white”, but it is also recognizing itself by thinking that this thing has or not the property that is allowed to it by the assertion of our proposition.

This judgment of recognizing the truth or the falsity of this proposition expresses a necessary movement: as an addressee of ourselves as speakers, we are unable not to do it. We must do it following the law that is linking our propositions to the reality that we are describing and about which we are affirming that they are what we are saying about them when we are effectively saying them and when we are affirming their truth. Kant conceived this necessary anticipation of reflexion enshrined in our use of proposition by naming this one as “a transcendental truth”, i. e. as a necessarily presupposed truth. C. S. Peirce expressed it with his own terms: “every proposition affirms its own truth”. We must think our propositions as true in order to be able to objectivize the visual facts that are corresponding to them as well as to objectivize our physical actions and our consummatory actions or desires that are corresponding to these ones. This is necessary in order to produce the only relation to reality that we can obtain, for example, the visual perception of the visual fact as the recognition of what allows this fact to exist. This is also necessary in order to perceive our physical action as a real one and as an objective one, i. e. to choose it as an action that has to become a reality. This recognitive use of our creative and objective judgment is as necessary for us as addressees of ourselves as the creative judgment is necessary to present the things to ourselves in order to be able to know them, i.e. to know what it is for them to exist by means of the predicate or by means of the terms for the relations that are binding different things. Our faculty of recognition is therefore the application of our listening faculty upon itself and is developing itself by the use of our recognitive judgement.

Like we are seeing these things and their relationships and like we are seeing them by enjoying their existence and their modes of being, we are looking forward to let exist our relationships with the other human beings by establishing what we call our speech-acts or our dialog. The motivation to let these relations exist is therefore as well hedonistic as eudemonist: we want to let recognize by our dialogue partners that we enjoy these relations that we are bringing about as well as we are enjoying mutually with these partners that they exist between us and that we are made together identified with these relationships. We owe our existence as an autonomous existence by let us being towards these relationships as creative, as enjoying and as recognitive. We simultaneously allow our partners to be the promise, the agreement, and so on. that we are expressing and we are letting them enjoy these speech acts by understanding them. The dialogic relationships are therefore obeying to the law of truth like our faculty of thinking is already explicitly recognized to be obeying to it. We have to recognize the reality of ourselves in these relationships in order to know what we are and that we are happy to recognize ourselves in these communications as well as in the real experiences that they are making possible. This dialogic life must be creative as well as enjoyable and recognitive. This common enjoyment is the source of our life and is characterising human life as human. But this enjoyment that we are feeling by using our words or our thoughts is only an ersatz of happiness because as a reflexive and regulative phenomenon, it is only the necessary ersatz of our experiences of life. These experiences of enjoyment are nothing for us if they are not transferred themselves in our experiences of real life and if they are not producing these real experiences of ourselves and of our partners as phenomena of happiness as intense as the happiness that is accompanying our experiences of dialogue and of private or of common thought about them. This common experience of our human reality and of our common joy is therefore thereby becoming the measurement standards of the culture of our common humanity.

The Civilisational Neutralisation of Our Faculty of Listening

This experience that is characterizing all our experiences as well as the experience of our humanity itself has invented itself as the object of itself by creating an intellectual discipline: we are usually calling this discipline “philosophy”. But this experience is not only the privilege of this intellectual discipline, it is the innermost experience of the judgment that we are expressing in every thought, in every speech act and in every dialogue: it is always the listening of our listening that is here at its best, i. e. in its expressions and in its recognitive successes. But this is in no way as evident as I am writing it now. The discovery of this experience needs to happen and this happens only when we make us able to deduce the genealogy of thinking from the experience of uttering and listening sounds as well as from the experience of dialoguing with others.

Without the recognition of this experience by the anthropobiology, this experience was remaining what was impossible to do and to recognize as such since we were anticipating our social partner as an enemy. Our civilisational legend is teaching us this anticipation as a truth characterising our humanity and affirms that it is making necessary our civilisational process: it is affirming this since we think that we have to protect ourselves against him or her. This civilisational legend took its source in the religion of the souverain gods and was operating very efficiently since then in our socio-political institutions. This presupposed anticipation of our social partner as an enemy is constituting the institutional presupposition of every relationship to him or to her. Its fatal result is that we are necessarily destructing our human link with our social partners when we think that this legend is true. We are destructing the anticipative movement of ensuring a common link of enjoyment with these partners by denying that this movement is animating the truth of what we are saying to them.

This institution is indeed denying the unique common humanity that can exist between human beings. But it is operating this destructive effect only if it is felt by all of us as a common truth and if it is recognized as the object of our common experience. It is not only destroying what we call “our social link”, it is destroying what is making this social link possible. It is therefore neutralising every common listening of what we are and of what we are conscious to have to do. This neutralisation of our common listening and of our common enjoying of our human life has therefore phylogenetically neutralized the experience of inventing philosophy itself and the recognitive experience of the fact that we are necessarily always philosophising in order to be able to live. By thinking that our body is the prison of our soul and that our soul, i. e. our mind, has to master our bodily desires and actions, Plato was “interiorising” into the relation to ourselves our presumed link to the others as enemies: our thought and our mind had to master the enemies of themselves that the human desires would be. This neutralisation was conceptualised by the dualism between body and mind that was consistently adopted in the history of philosophy by philosophers that ignored that thinking is an activity that is made possible by a bodily activity: by the activity of listening itself that allows us to judge the reality of the realities of the world as well as the realities of our gratifying dialogic relationships with our human fellows.

By using this dualism between mind and body, philosophy inherited, the civilisational neutralisation of the mind till our century. As an intellectual discipline, it had to overcome this civilisational dualism by discovering the birth of thought as a product of our physical and mental listening to ourselves. It is the reason why the anthropobiological description of this birth and of the necessary activity of enjoyment that is accompanying it, is so important for the contemporary development of mankind. Because the listening to ourselves is conditioning and regulating our ability to live, it is making us able to see that this neutralisation is only a sickness affecting our power of reflexion. It is making us able to recognize that its creative power and the effectivity of overcoming this neutralisation is nevertheless happening every day in order to overcome this deadly neutralisation of our listening to ourselves. The philosophy that we are already practicing not as professional philosophers, but as simple users of our thought and of our dialogues with others is overcoming the civilisationist error and mistake in everybody of us as soon as he or she must confront himself or herself to this neutralisation when this one is met as a constitutive and a dysfunctional use of our capacity of judging the truth of our relationships with the others.

This capacity of self-resilience of our listening faculty has given from itself an existence and a cultural visibility to what we are calling « arts » and to what we are calling our « cultural world »: in these worlds are collected and selected all the experiences of real common happinesses where we are living as our real successes of life. All artworks are trying to create and are pretending to present to us the pure experience of what really exists as a human enjoyment. It is usually not recognized as such because the cultural world is separated from our civilisational world as if this institutional world would be the only world that is real and as if our cultural would be only a world of compensatory happiness’s that are only phantasmated and not effectively as real for our lives that we think that they are. This artificial division and opposition between civilisation and culture is deadly as well as the categorisation of our world that it is affecting.

Academic and official philosophy usually grounded this division on the fact that it discovered itself as a discipline affirming the importance of thought and dialogue in our existence and because it was presenting itself as an academic discipline that possessed the exceptional and disciplinary capacity of administrating the truth in our worlds and in our life’s. Because it discovered our capacity to listen to the world by means of our descriptive propositions, the Greek and the modern philosophy gave to our mind the ability to apply it to our social practices. The listening of ourselves was recognized as the ability to discern the truth of our imperatives like was recognized to this listening of ourselves its ability to affirma the truth of our perception of the world in the scientific propositions. It was transformed by Kant in the human ability to recognize what must be done by what he called our consciousness of « the categorical imperative »: the consciousness of having to do what we are conscious of having to realize and to realize it when we are motivated by the unique consciousness of having to realize it. It was what he called the characteristic of the humanity of the human being: it was associated in his Anthropology from a pragmatical point of view [5] with the ability of the human being to be able to produce oneself unconditionally, i. e. with its ability to be free and to determine the conditions of its human existence without any constraints.

Academic and official philosophy usually grounded this division on the fact that it discovered itself as a discipline affirming the importance of thought and dialogue in our existence and because it was presenting itself as an academic discipline that possessed the exceptional and disciplinary capacity of administrating the truth in our worlds and in our life’s. Because it discovered our capacity to listen to the world by means of our descriptive propositions, the Greek and the modern philosophy gave to our mind the ability to apply it to our social practices. The listening of ourselves was recognized as the ability to discern the truth of our imperatives like was recognized to this listening of ourselves its ability to affirma the truth of our perception of the world in the scientific propositions. It was transformed by Kant in the human ability to recognize what must be done by what he called our consciousness of « the categorical imperative »: the consciousness of having to do what we are conscious of having to realize and to realize it when we are motivated by the unique consciousness of having to realize it. It was what he called the characteristic of the humanity of the human being: it was associated in his Anthropology from a pragmatical point of view [5] with the ability of the human being to be able to produce oneself unconditionally, i. e. with its ability to be free and to determine the conditions of its human existence without any constraints.

But the experimental use of our propositions is unable of confirming the validity of this transfer of certainty from their descriptive use to their prescriptive use: from the image of ourself as an experimentation of hypotheses, it is not valid to deduce logically any prescription or imperative whatever. To-day in our experimental and pragmatic world that is dominating us as users of our speechacts, this consciousness of our categorical imperative is therefore confirming itself to-day as necessarily void and invalid, i.e. and therefore as necessarily inexistent and inefficient. But in our civilisational horizon of thought, this consciousness seems nonetheless the only one thinking and expressing instance that is remaining today from our listening of ourselves. The only solution that is accessible to this consciousness is effectively to recognize itself as the consciousness that it is effectively, i. e. the consciousness of listening itself and inventing itself as a new way of life by finding a new way of rejoicing all of us in a common experience of this life. It has only to recognize the consciousness as what it is effectively: as the faculty of listening itself, i.e. as the capacity that we have to recalling ourselves into the anticipatory projections and motivations of ourselves that our cultural past is giving to us in its archives or that our contemporary arts are inventing for us.

But this one seems also problematic and void. As Hegel stigmatized it, the artistic sensibilisation of reason that follows from the limitation of our knowledge to our sensible world, is forcing us to recognize that we are looking for a mode of life that is rejoicing us, i. e. like the perceptive visual fact was rejoicing the baby in its visual use of the prosopopoeia. Even all the arts seem unable to let us rejoicing ourselves by mobilising our judgment towards sensitive modalities of happiness in an objective way. Like Kant had to admit in his Critique of judgment [6], they seem to express only what could eventually rejoice us as an ersatz of life, i. e. as a pleasure that could be felt as such by all of us, although it could not be proved that it is presenting us a happiness that could be considered as an objective condition of our life. With his words, it cannot be a determinative judgment: it would be only a reflexive judgment that is generalising itself to all human beings as a pure effect of joy that has no real impact on our reality.

The only reality that could assume this consciousness in this perverted horizon, would be the reality to which the German Romantics identified us: the feeling of love. This feeling had to be considered by them as the only authoritative instance that could guide our life by regulating morally our relations to the others and to ourselves. Like C. S. Peirce assumed it after them, they were creating a cultural instance: our agapeistic feeling, that was presumed to be the unique regulative instance of our internal listening of ourselves. Only this exclusively affective rousseauist voice of God in us could be considered as the unique regulative instance of our life. Dedicated as the last instance inhabiting in us, it was indeed recognized as an instance comparable as an absolute mental hypostasis endowed with the sense of our categorical sense of duty. It had therefore to be considered as the unique regulative instance of our practical reason, as the unique instance that was really embodying our listening of ourselves and of the others. But we would be unable to explain the role of the last instance that we would give accordingly to our feeling as the only instance able to guide our life and to become its own condition of life as our unique condition of life. This instance would be nevertheless dependant of our effective capacity to be affected by it and to recognize it as the only event of love that has to inspire our life. It had to be revered as the event that we are unable to produce by our own will and that cannot be predicted. It had to be as such as a fortuitous event in order to be able to work as such an instance. We cannot deny that it is sufficient that we are able to recognize us as a loving being in our thoughts and to reveal it to the person that we love, to let recognize it by the other person.

But one could be tempted, like Novalis was, to prove its reality and its performative power as constitutive of our humanity and to link this instance to the only intraspecific instinct that could give to this agapeistic feeling an energetic power by means of reducing it to its libidinal basis. Following Freud, in order to listen oneself in the horizon of the identificatory love of our psychanalyst, it would be enough to remember us, by developing our free mental association, the traumatic events that helped us in the past from realizing the satisfaction of our love in order to give them a new interpretation, i.e. the libidinal interpretation that could give us a real mental and disclosing pleasure. We could be thereby emancipated of their disturbing and hysterical effects and of their dysfunctionality in our present life. This psychoanalytical renewal of the archaic chamanistic practices would give us the access to all the consummatory actions that we could desire and would let us to be: it would let us become as free as the pragmatic anthropology of Kant prescribed it to ourselves. To listen to us psychoanalytically could indeed let us forget the past traumatic events in a way similar to the archaic chamanistic experiences, but the problem is that it cannot happen so easily. In order to be able to do it, we must express these interpretations with words and judgments by means of which we give them a reality, i. e. considering them as the reality of our reality and by means of which we are judging that they are or not our reality, i. e. the unique reality that is still enjoying us. In order to give them the energetic power of emancipating us from our hysteria or from our obsessions, we must therefore listen to them as if they could be the experiences that make us happy because we are able to recognize ourselves in them and to consider them as our objective conditions of life.

The Philosophical Self-Resilience of Our Dialogical Faculty of Listening

But we must recognize that, in this case too, we are only using the self-resilience that our listening to ourselves is bringing about in every dialogue. The same remark would be true of the emancipation that we are looking for towards our civilisationnist prescriptions of behaviour. We would emancipate only ourselves from our libinal desires like we are already emancipating ourselves from the civilisationnal regulations expressed by our juridical laws (civil, civics and penal). We have not to reject them globally as if they would be all bad, we have to choose amongst them the laws that are allowing us to enjoy the « common happiness » that is usually called « justice » or « common good » inside our civilisationnal world. In order to recognize their validity or the absence of validity, we have to judge whether they are presenting to us the modalities of actions by means of which we recognize what we are, what joy they are giving us to live and what joy we accept to be living. We have to listen to their effective enjoying power because we are able to hear them as already embodying the reality of our humanity.

These two experiences of emancipation are not preconceived by our dualism between mind and body, but they are only using the same creative and recognitive judgments inhabitating our use of language that we described at the beginning of this paper. It is happening as soon as we have to confront us to every situation of uncertainty to which we are confronted, i.e. at every time. But usually, outside of the juridical or libidinal environments, we use these two kinds of judgments as judgments that have to be as objective as scientific judgments must be: by means of them, we listen to what we are and to what we have to enjoy when we are effectively what the knowledge, the action or the desire that we are thinking or saying, are saying that we are. Listening to oneself always involves identifying the thought, the speech act, or the dialogical expression through which we creatively attempt to define who we are and what we must do to find happiness in being who we are: we are thereby necessarily what we are discovering of ourselves by the use of these two sorts of judgments, of thought or of speech-acts expressed with our words.

The use of the recognitive judgment allows therefore us to judge simultaneously whether our listening of ourselves obtained by the use of our creative judgment, is effectively allowing us to recognize that we are effectively what we are expressing about ourselves. In a private thought, it is constitutively always a dialogue by which we look for a real happiness in the thought that we are thinking as well as in a real dialogue with a social partner, where we are looking too for a common happiness. Like we wrote it, it is this common happinesses that we are creating and projecting as an anticipation of our harmonisation with our dialogue partner: this anticipation is constitutive of our dialogical cognition. Much more this dialogical condition is constituting of our human condition and is determining the presumed radical and constitutive motivation to be what we are. This motivation is indeed determining the access to our capacity of making ourselves free, i. e. to be what we are when we are thinking or when we are saying what we say. The agreement that we are asking from our partner by the simple fact that we are talking to him or to her is animating our utterance as an anticipation of his or her recognitive judgment and is presupposing that we are recognizing its truth by our affirmation of it as a speech-act or as a dialogical affirmation. It is presupposing too that we affirm it as an anticipation of the existence of the production of a common happiness.

This dialogical condition is constraining us to listen to us and to the others as well as to be what we obtain to know about us as the realities that we are bringing about. This faculty of listening oneself is our usual use of our faculty of philosophising ourselves without having to know necessarily that we are this faculty. The philosophy as an academic or intellectual discipline has to prove to us that we are this faculty of listening to us as well as to the others and that we have recognized to be concretely and singularly this faculty when we have learnt it from this discipline. Because we are ourselves, before this reception of this teaching, only by means of using and developing this faculty by the simple fact of dialoguing with others or by the simple fact of thinking, we have already the power that our human ears are giving us: the power to listen to ourselves and this power is already working, by means of its creative judgment as well as by means of in its recognitive judgment, in its objectivity as well as a rejoicing event. By using these judgments, we became able to assimilate ourselves and our dialogue partners to this objective power before the philosophical anthropobiology was able to reveal it to ourselves. Till then it was able to remain an unconscious but nonetheless efficacious power of talking and of reflexion that was able to cure itself by creating and evaluating the self-resilience that it was successfully obtaining [7].

Fichte affirmed in his book: The way towards the blessed life [8] that we have to know the Christian doctrine that is affirming us as loving children of God in order to become able to accede to this blessed life and to the happiness that we are driving for. But the philosophical anthropobiology is teaching us that we don’t have effectively to know this religious doctrine to be as happy as we wish to be. In order to accede to the blessed life that our dialogical use of language is already promising and effectively giving to us, we have only to progress towards the blessed life that we are affirming by means of our thoughts or by means of our words to ourselves and to our own partners that we are. We are this power of self-resilience as soon as we begin to talk with ourselves or with the others. The reason is very simple: we are doing this in every dialogue whatever it could be private, intersubjective or public. We are making us thereby able to appropriate to ourselves this capacity of self-resilience that our use of language is offering to us both as a reality and as a happiness, even when our dialogical strive towards the others or towards ourselves is not magically rewarded.

But this resilience that is usual, but that seems also extraordinary, may also be intended and affirmed directly by our artistic listening of the world, of the others and of ourselves and by the utterances that are expressing its results. This use of language allows us to overcome the dualism between body and mind that is so destructing for the cultural development of ourselves. This listening faculty that is characterising us, affirms itself and recognizes itself as itself in the arts: it is expressing itself there as the source of joy that it is giving to the other senses as well as the joy that is accompanying all our life experiences, included the experience of dialoguing. It does not simply consist to affirm itself as the source of the satisfaction of ours o-called primitive instincts although our consummatory epoch is often imposing this error to-day as a truth and although it is trying thereby to convince us that the arts are culturally dead or that they are bringing about products that have only an economic value. The artistic faculty of listening ourselves is always making itself resilient as soon as it is able to affirm itself by transmitting its own Joice to itself, i. e. by letting here itself as poetry, as pictures, as dramaturgy, as music, as architecture or as dances. Every time they are trying to let dialoguing our senses like we are dialoguing with our words with our social partners and with ourselves.

The contemporary discovery of the aesthetics of happiness in our use of language as the source of perceptions and of arts allows us to reinterpret anew the aesthetic judgment. This one can no more be reduced into an affective recognition of the beautiful that could be brought about without the help of a concept, as Kant and Heidegger thought it had to be. This reduction of the experience of an objective and an artistic happiness to the perception of its beauty is only a visual and reductive ersatz of what the experience of cultural or artistic happiness is. The artistic creation of the figures of happiness is crowning the choice of our forms of life that we are bringing about when we are projecting our truth agreements and the enjoyments that we are feeling in them, into the happiness of life that we are looking for.

The artistic judgment that is guiding the creation of a work of art follows therefore the same dynamics as our use of language and is obeying to the same dialogical law. It must identify the cultural happiness’s that are happening in our social and mental worlds and try to give an independent existence to these objective enjoyments by integrating thereby the best ways of living a human life by the uses of our five senses. To figure these happiness’s is to transform them into sensible realities that can be recognized as objective as such ones because they are indeed real and because we are presenting these happiness’s as real, and as much real as our perceptive world is. Their prosopopoeia nature of the self-listening of ourselves allows to make the experience of enjoying oneself in the recognition of these happiness’s as our own truths because they manifest the modes of life that they are making us objectively happy. It is giving thereby an independent existence to the best life that we could live, but it is also acting in such a way that these happiness’s are objectively recognized as such, i. e. that our cultures are able to recognize these forms of life as the best forms of human life that we are able to live now. If a culture is denying to itself the capacity to judge the objectivity of these forms of life, it is enclosing itself into this kind of autism that civilisationnism and neo- liberalism are imposing today to our social relationships.

If we need always an experience of art, it is not because we are dying of our experience of truth and for the unique reason that the experience of art would be the only one that could let us experience our humanity. But it is on the contrary because our aesthetical experience of truth remains unbroken as a creative and recognitive power: it is because it is always affirming its power of enlarging the domain of realities and of gratifications open by our experiences of sharing truth, it is because these are always already presiding our capacity of rejoicing ourselves in the living experiences of an effective happiness that can be as well private as common [9,10].

Acknowledgement

None.

Conflict of Interest

None.

References

1. Gehlen A (2021) Man: His Nature and Place in the World, Paris, Gallimard.
2. Tomatis A, Loreille, et la vie (1991) Paris, Robert Laffont, 1977 and The Conscious Ear: My Life of Transformation through Listening, Paris, Station Hill Press.
3. Von Humboldt G (1836) Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und Ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwickelung des Menschengeschlechts, 21 Verbum, [609], Berlin, Dümmler Verlag: p. 266-267.
4. (1896) This description is giving a solution to the problem that preoccupied the young psychologist John Dewey in his well-known article: The reflex arc concept in psychology in Psychological Review 3: p. 357-370.
5. Kant E (2006) Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
6. Kant E (2006) Critique of judgment. Oxford University Press.
7. Descombes V (1979) L’inconscient malgré lui, Paris, Minuit.
8. Fichte JG (2021) The way towards the blessed life, Legare Street Place.
9. Poulain J (2025) Philosophy as an Aesthetics of happiness » in Contemporary Aesthetics: Dialogues through Arts, Culture, and Media, Keynote Speeches from the 22^nd International Congress of Aesthetics, Ed. R. Duarte, Federal University of Minas Gerais: p.169-193,
10. (2025) La philosophie comme esthétique de l’allégresse », in La philosophie comme esthétique transculturelle, in Cany B. and J. Poulain (eds), Cahiers critiques de Philosophie, Nr 29, Paris, Hermann: p.83-112.